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INOTE I
The State Constitution as a Source of
Individual Liberties: Declining to Apply
the "Good-Faith" Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule in Commonwealth v.
Edmunds
In Commonwealth v. Edmunds,1 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, 2 there is no "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.'
Accordingly, drugs seized pursuant to a search warrant issued with-
out probable cause had to be suppressed, regardless of the acting
officer's belief in its validity.' This decision runs directly contrary to
the United States Supreme Court's recognition of such an exception
in the landmark decision United States v. Leon.
6
Construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the
Bill of Rights as providing more protection to the citizens of individ-
ual states than the federal provisions themselves is becoming increas-
ingly common.' As a part of maintaining a healthy federalism, state
I. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
2. Pa. Const. art. I, § 8.
3. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized a "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule's basic requirement that evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution be excluded from admission at trial. Under this excep-
tion, evidence seized pursuant to a warrant obtained in good faith and issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate, but later found to be defective, may still be used by the prosecution in its
case-in-chief. Id. at 913.
4. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 906.
5. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
6. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
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courts are at liberty to place greater restraints on police activity than
the Federal Constitution requires, as long as their decisions are
based entirely on state law and do not conflict with federal law.7 The
interpretation by the court in Edmunds of the exclusionary rule is
just such a decision. Further analysis of the exclusionary rule and
the "good-faith" exception in both the state and the federal context
is warranted to fully understand the impact of the court's holding in
this case.
In Commonwealth v. Edmunds8 a state trooper, in response to a
telephone call, met with two hunters who informed him that they
had seen marijuana growing in a white, corrugatted building in a
nearby wooded area.9 The officer made sure that the two men were
familiar enough with marijuana to be able to identify it, and then,
on the following day, flew over the area in question and spotted the
building. 10
A search warrant was issued in response to the trooper's sworn
affidavit, and he, along with several other state policemen, proceeded
to the Edmund's residence.1" Although marijuana had only been ob-
served in the white, corrugated building, the warrant was issued for
both the residence and for the building. 2 When the officers arrived
at the residence, they were informed by Edmunds that he rented the
building in question to another man." Edmunds vent upstairs to re-
trieve the lease, accompanied by an officer. At the top of the stairs,
in plain view, the officer saw four bags containing a green substance
later determined to be marijuana. 1' Edmunds was then arrested.15 A
subsequent search of the white, corrugated building revealed grow-
ing marijuana plants as well.16
Prior to the trial, Edmunds filed a motion to suppress the mari-
juana, maintaining that the police officer's affidavit was insufficient
to establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. 17 The
trial court held that the affidavit was deficient because it failed to set
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
7. Timothy R. Lohraff, United States v. Leon and Illinois '.. Gates: A Call for State
Courts to Develop State Constitutional Law, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 311 (1987).
8. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 368 (Pa. 1991).
9. Id. at 888.
10. Id. at 889.
11. Id.
12. Id. Although the warrant was held to be insufficient for failing to set forth the time
frame in which the marijuana was observed, it was also invalid in this respect.
13. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. 1991).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 889, 890.
17. Id. See also supra note 12.
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forth a time frame in which the marijuana was observed. 18 A sup-
pression hearing was then held, and it was determined that although
the affidavit was facially invalid, the officer involved had prepared it
in good faith and suppression was not necessary. 19 The court, in
reaching its decision, relied on the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in United States v. Leon.20 The Superior Court af-
firmed this decision, further holding that the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion afforded no greater protection to Pennsylvania's citizens than
the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision, holding that
when a search warrant affidavit is insufficient to establish probable
cause, no "good-faith" exception will be recognized.
2
Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 23 is very
similar to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.24 Both provide that no warrants shall be issued without proba-
ble cause. 5 The framers of the United States Constitution chose
probable cause as "the device . . . to balance privacy rights against
the state's duty to enforce the law."'26 The decision in Common-
wealth v. Edmunds is in strict compliance with the Pennsylvania
Constitution and demands a showing of probable cause to a detached
and neutral magistrate before any warrant will issue; the penalty for
failing to do so is exclusion of any evidence obtained. 7
United States v. Leon, however, seems to downplay the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment. Leon "substitutes a procedural for a
substantive definition of probable cause; probable cause within the
bounds of plain error is whatever a magistrate says it is."'28 Exclu-
18. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 889-90 (Pa. 1991).
19. Id. at 889.
20. Id. at 890.
21. Id. at 889.
22. Id.
23. Pa. Const. art. 1, § 8 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to
seize any person or thing shall issue without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to
by the affiant.
24. U.S. Const. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
25. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 8, U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
26. See Lohraff, supra note 7, at 315.
27. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
28. Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986).
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sion of evidence obtained with a warrant, regardless of whether or
not it was issued with probable cause, will "be ordered only on a
case by case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion
will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule." '29
The difference in interpretation of such similar provisions be-
comes more comprehensible when the exclusionary rule and its un-
derlying purposes are viewed in a historical context. Over one hun-
dred years ago, in Boyd v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court first recognized the need to exclude evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment in order to preserve the integrity of
individual rights.3" The Court in Boyd recognized the importance of
safeguarding both Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and declared
unconstitutional the use of any evidence seized without probable
cause.31 This position was reiterated thirty years later in Weeks v.
United States when the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
barred the use of all evidence obtained through illegal search and
seizure.a The exclusionary rule was further expanded by the Su-
preme Court in decisions such as Silverthorne Lumber v. United
States and Gouled v. United States.3
However, in 1949, with its decision in Wolf v. Colorado, the
Court changed its position by declining to impose the exclusionary
rule upon the individual states.3 ' Wolf allowed the states to deter-
mine for themselves whether to apply the exclusionary rule or to rely
on other equally effective methods for protecting Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights." Twelve years later, the Court acknowledged
"the obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the pro-
tection of other remedies ' 36 and extended the rule to the states in
Mapp v. Ohio.37 Evidence seized without probable cause, either with
or without a warrant, had to be suppressed on a nationwide basis
29. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984).
30. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Boyd marked the historical begin-
ning of the exclusionary rule. Fourth and Fifth Amendment freedoms were regarded as too
precious to be compromised in any way.
31. Id. at 634.
32. Weeks held that if illegally obtained evidence could be u:;ed against an accused citi-
zen, the provisions of the Fourth Amendment "may as well be stricken from the Constitution."
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391, 392 (1914).
33. Silverthorne mandated the suppression of copies of illegally seized evidence, even
after the actual evidence was returned. Silverthorne Lumber v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920). Gouled applied the exclusionary rule even where the defendant did not seek the return
of the seized evidence. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
34. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
35. Id. at 33.
36. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
37. Id.
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under the Mapp decision.38
The Mapp decision remained largely unchanged until the crea-
tion of the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule twenty-
three years later in United States v. Leon. 39 Leon represents the state
of federal exclusionary law as it exists today: the Fourth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution does not require suppression of evi-
dence obtained with an invalid warrant if the police have acted with
reasonable reliance on its supposed validity.40
The history of the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania prior to the
Edmunds decision is very different from its federal counterpart.
"[C]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures existed in Pennsylvania more than a decade before the adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution and fifteen years prior to the pro-
mulgation of the Fourth Amendment." 4' The protection provided to
Pennsylvania's citizens by article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution is broad and extends to all areas where an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.42 While exceptions to the
exclusionary rule have been made in the past,' 3 more recent Pennsyl-
vania cases apply the rule strictly. 44 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision not to apply the "good-faith" exception in Edmunds
is well rooted in the state's exclusionary rule precedent.' 5
Other states that have had the opportunity to determine
whether or not to apply the "good-faith" exception are almost evenly
divided in their decisions. Arkansas,40 Indiana,' 7 Arizona,'8 Mis-
38. Id.
39. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
40. Id. at 914.
41. Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 466 (Pa. 1983).
42. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979) (holding that the ad-
mission into evidence of the defendant's canceled check, obtained pursuant to an invalid sub-
poena, constituted reversible error), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
43. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Brown, 368 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1976) (holding that if the
prosecution can establish that illegally obtained evidence would have been discovered anyway
in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, the exclusionary rule need not be applied);
Commonwealth v. Milliken, 300 A.2d 78 (Pa. 1973) (allowing oral testimony by the affiant to
establish a basis for probable cause in the issuance of the warrant); Commonwealth v. Rundle,
194 A.2d 143 (Pa. 1963) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule extended, to the states by
Mapp in a retroactive manner).
44. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Me-
lilli, 555 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1989); Sell; 470 A.2d 457; DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283.
45. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896.
46. Jackson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 831 (Ark. 1987). Drug charges were upheld in this
case on the basis that the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule justified a search
based on a facially valid warrant issued in response to a deficient affidavit. Id. at 834.
47. Mers v. State, 482 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). Indiana applied the "good-
faith" exception in this case to uphold a conviction of theft when officers acted in reasonable
reliance on a deficient warrant. Id. at 786.
48. State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519 (Ariz. 1984). The Arizona court held that the "indepen-
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souri, "'9 and Kansas5 follow the holding in Leon and will not exclude
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant issued in good faith. How-
ever, New York,5 1 Michigan,5" North Carolina,5 3 Connecticut,5' and
New Jersey55 adhere to the more rigid, traditional interpretation of
the exclusionary rule. None of these decisions reflect a blind follow-
ing of the Supreme Court's decision. Instead, like Edmunds, they
demonstrate an in-depth analysis of both state and federal constitu-
tional law. More and more state courts are taking seriously "their
obligations as coequal guardians of civil rights and liberties." 56
Another reason for the contrasting views of the United States
Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with regard to
the exclusionary rule is the difference in perception of the underlying
purposes of the rule. Under the federal interpretation, the sole pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police con-
duct.57 It is viewed simply as a judicial remedy s8 to be applied or
withheld at the court's discretion.
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, takes a more liberal view of
the underlying meaning of the exclusionary rule. Its purpose is not
merely to deter unreasonable police conduct, but also to "redress the
injury to the privacy of the search victim." ' 59 The right to be free
dent source doctrine" under the exclusionary rule of the Arizona Constitution would be ap-
plied to prevent the exclusion of evidence obtained during the illegal "securing" of defendant's
home. The "independent source doctrine" maintains that if the search warrant was based on a
source not dependent on the illegal actions of "securing" the premises, exclusion was not nec-
essary. Id. at 527.
49. State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986). Missouri's judicially created exclusion-
ary rule was modified to allow for the "good-faith" exception of Leon. Id. at 147.
50. State v. Huber, 704 P.2d 1004 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985). This decision declared that the
scope of section 15 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution was identical to the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution and therefore implicitly adopted the "good-faith" ex-
ception of Leon. Id. at 1011.
51. People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985). The New York Constitution was
held to afford greater protection to New York citizens than the Federal Constitution. No ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule was recognized. Id. at 458.
52. People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (specifically declining
to follow Leon).
53. State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988). The court in this case declined to
apply the "good-faith" exception to admit a blood sample into evidence that had been taken
without a warrant. Id. at 562.
54. State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990). (Defendant's drug conviction was re-
versed when the Connecticut Supreme Court held the "good-faith" exception to be incompati-
ble with the state's constitutional provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.).
55. State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987).
56. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
57. Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986) (citing United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)).
58. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
59. Paul Reidinger, States' Rights: Courts Push Beyond U.S. Constitution, 77 A.B.A. J.
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from unreasonable searches and seizures, contained in Article 1, sec-
tion 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, is tied to the implicit right
to privacy in Pennsylvania." The Supreme Court's decision in Com-
monwealth v. Edmunds flows naturally from this interpretation of
the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
The decision in Edmunds reflects a deep-rooted tradition of re-
spect for individual privacy rights in Pennsylvania. While the failure
to apply the "good-faith" exception may in some cases allow guilty
defendants to go free,61 it also, and more importantly, preserves the
integrity of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. At a time when more and more individual
liberties are being curtailed on a federal level, state courts are re-
turning to their own constitutions to deal with issues that have been
left to the United States Supreme Court for forty years.6 2 State
courts must continue to interpret their own laws on a separate basis
from federal law in order to guarantee the full realization of per-
sonal liberties throughout this country."
Andrea Lynn Bistline
84 (May 1991).
60. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291 (Pa. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1032 (1980).
61. Craig D. Uchida et al., Acting In Good Faith: The Effects of United States v. Leon
on the Police and Courts, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 467 (1988). This article summarizes the results of
a study identifying the effects of the Leon decision on police practices and prosecutorial and
judicial conduct. Overall, the effects of the decision on the search warrant process have been
minimal. Id. at 491.
62. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165 (1984).
63. Brennan, supra note 6, at 491.

